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I. PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Primary Jurisdiction and Its Subsequent Effect on Judicial Review
In Rosado v. Wyman' the Supreme Court held that neither the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction 2 nor that of exhaustion of
administrative remedies3 precluded federal court jurisdiction of an
action brought by welfare recipients seeking to determine whether a
1969 amendment to New York's Social Services Law 4 was
inconsistent with the requirements of section 402(a)(23) of the Federal
Social Security Act.5 That statute is concerned with the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal-state
public welfare program under which matching funds aid needy
children who have been deprived of the support of one or both
parents.' In order to take advantage of the substantial federal funds
In addition to the Editorial Board and Staff of the Duke Law Journal, the following assisted
with the Project: Howard M. Boyd, Larry E. Christensen, Charles D. Ganz, David W. Hardee,
III, Elisabeth S. Petersen, and Wendell Schollander.
1. 397 U.S. 397 (1970), rev'g 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.), vacating and revg 304 F. Supp. 1356
(E.D.N.Y. 1969).
2. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19 (1958, Supp. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 121-51
(1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
3. See generally 3 DAVIS § 20; JAFFE 424-58.
4. N.Y. Social Services Law § 131-a, ch. 184, § 5 [McKinney 1969] N.Y. Sess. Laws 217,
as amended, N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 131-a (McKinney Supp. 1970). After the Supreme
Court decision in Rosado, the New York Legislature revised section 131-a, declaring its intent to
comply with federal requirements. Ch. 517, § I [McKinney 1970] N.Y. Sess. Laws 1158-59.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1970).
6. Id. §§ 601, 606. See generally Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment In
Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 555 (1970); Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-
Living Adjustment forA FDC Recipients: A Case Study in Welfare Administration, 118 U. PA.
L. REV. 1143 (1970); Comment, Section 402(a)(23) of the 1967 Social Security Act
Amendments:A False Hope?; 58 GEo. L.J. 591 (1970).
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available for A FDC, a state must submit a plan for the approval of
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare7 which conforms with
several requirements of the Social Security Act8 and with rules and
.regulations promulgated by HEW;9 if the state fails to comply with
any provision of section 402(a), the Secretary of HEW, after notice
and hearing, may terminate federal payments.10 The affected state
may seek judicial review from such a finding of nonconformity in the
federal courts of appeal.
In March, 1969, New York amended section 131-a of its Social
Services Law by adopting a system which based maximum AFDC
allowances upon the number of persons in a household." This new
plan abandoned a computation of "standard of need" on an
individualized basis and made no provision for items previously
covered under "special" grants for regularly recurring expenses. 13 At
the time the welfare recipients initiated their suit challenging this
scheme, HEW had already commenced administrative proceedings,
although not a hearing, to determine whether New York's AFDC
amendment was in compliance With the Social Security Act. The
Rosado plaintiffs were not involved in the HEW proceedings,
however, for neither the Social Security Act nor HEW regulations
provides a means for AFDC recipients to challenge the legality of a
state statutory scheme before the federal agency. 4 The plaintiffs urged
that section 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act requires cost-of-
living increases to be taken into account in computing welfare
payment schedules and that this requirement precluded any
computation of an individual's "standard of need" which reduced the
total cost estimated necessary for basic subsistence. 5 The district
7. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. V, 1970).
8. Id. § 602.
9. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20-.140 (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (Supp. V, 1970). Alternatively, the Secretary in his discretion may
restrict federal payments to categories of the state plan not affected by its failure of compliance.
Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1970).
12. Ch. 184, § 5 [McKinney 1969] N.Y. ess. Laws 217, as amended, N.Y. Soc. SERVICES
LAW § 131-a (McKinney Supp. 1970).
13. 397 U.S. at416, 418.
14. Id. at 406 & n.8. HEW has freely admitted the validity of this statement. Id. at 429-30
(Appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., concurring); National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429
F.2d 725, 731 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Catholic Medical Center, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp.
1268, 1270 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 820, reinstated district court
opinion affld, 430 F.2d 1297 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 931 (1970). See also Note,
Federal JudicialReview of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84,91 (1967).
15. For a discussion of the "standard of need" computation required of states participating
in the AFDC program see 118 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 6, at 1144-45 & n.6.
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court found jurisdiction and granted relief on the merits,"6 but the
Second Circuit reversed, finding neither jurisdiction nor substance in
the claims presented. 7 The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, determining that the district court had properly retained
jurisdiction and was not required to defer hearing the welfare
recipients' petition, despite the fact that HEW had not yet held
conformity hearings nor determined the validity of the New York
statute.'8
In deciding not to require deferral of judgment to HEW, the
Supreme Court considered two doctrines which might influence a
court to await agency determination. The first doctrine involved is
exhaustion of administrative remedies, which provides that recourse
to a federal court is proper only after all available administrative
remedies have been exhausted." If no remedy exists, the doctrine is
not applicable;2° therefore, AFDC claimants probably would not fall
within the doctrine, since H EW has not established procedures to hear
recipient challenges td the legality of state welfare programs. 21
Primary jurisdiction is the second doctrine which might prompt a
court to yield to an agency before deciding an issue. It provides that,
in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of
judges or requiriig the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies
created by Congress for regulating the subject matter involved
"should not be passed over. ' 22 The purpose of this wholly judge-made
doctrine is not to divide powers between courts and agencies but to
determine which tribunal should take initial action. 23 Thus, a court
may have jurisdiction and yet stay its proceedings pending
administrative determination of a particular issue 24 or dismiss the case
16. Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
17. Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969); see 397 U.S. at 414 n.18 (explaining
how the Second Circuit found no jurisdiction yet "ruled" on the merits).
18. 397 U.S. at 406.
19. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); Meyers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
20. Cf., Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 634-35 (1941); JAFFE 426.
21. 67 COLUM. L. Rav., supra note 14, at 102. But if the rationale behind the exhaustion
doctrine focuses upon ripeness for adjudication and deference to established administrative
procedures, it could be argued that HEW administrative procedures--conformity hearings and
informal conferences which would determine the same issue the claimants would raise in
court-should be allowed to run their course prior to judicial action.
22. 'Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
23. DAvis § 19.09, at 53.
24. E.g., General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 432-33
(1940); Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. FPC, 421 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir. 1970).
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even though the eventual agency decision will be subject to judicial
review.25 The rationale for the application of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine is traditionally expressed in terms of both the necessity for
uniformity of application of a law and the need for administrative
expertise. 26 Commentators agree that the doctrine is primarily
applicable to controversies arising in the so-called regulated
industries 27 but disagree as to the major criteria triggering its
invocation. Professor Jaffe emphasizes legislative intent, as
implemented by a pervasive and systematic scheme of agency
regulation, as the factor prompting deference to administrative
determination.2 8 Professor Davis contends that the principal criterion
for determining the applicability of primary jurisdiction is whether
there is judicial need for resort to administrative judgment.2 The case
law development seems to support both positions..
The primary jurisdiction doctrine was first promulgated by the
Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co., 30 where a shipper contended that a published carrier rate was
unreasonable and sued the carrier in a state court for the excess. The
Supreme Court held that only the Interstate Commerce Commission
could determine whether the carrier rate was reasonable. Although the
Commerce Act provided for concurrent jurisdiction in the agency and
the courts, 31 the Court reasoned that the purpose of the Act was to
provide for uniform rates and that state court jurisdiction, without
prior recourse to the agency, would render the act unenforceable.32
Thus, the case creating the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not
mention agency expertise; rather, the Court sought to further the
uniform application of a federal statute. In Great Northern Railway
v. Merchants Elevator Co.Y the Supreme Court limited the doctrine
25. Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 577 (1952).
26. United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Far East Conf. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1953); JAFFE 123-25.
27. DAVIS § 19.01, at 5; JAFFE 133. See also Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Furniture
Forwarders Inc., 420 F.2d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1970); Petruccelli & Long, Antitrust and the
Regulated Industries: The Role of the "Doctrine" of Primary Jurisdiction, 1969 TOLEDO L.
REV. 303. But see Catholic Medical Center, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.N.Y.
1969) (suggesting that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be relevant to a consideration of
the relationship between HEW and the courts).
28. JAFFE 124.
29. DAVIS § 19.09, at 53.
30. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
31. 49 U.S.C. §§ 9,22 (1964).
32. 204 U.S. at 441.
33. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
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by holding it inapplicable to the interpretation of a railroad shipping
tariff containing words which were "used in their ordinary
meaning" since the construction of the document posed a legal issue
determinable by a court without prior recourse to the agency. The
question in Great Northern was solely one of law, with no disputed
factual questions, nor any leeway for agency discretion; therefore,
agency expertise was not required,3 5 courts being quite experienced in
the interpretation of the legal effect of writings.38 This law-fact
distinction was qualified by United States v. Western Pacific
Railroad,37 where the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction required a tariff first to be construed by the ICC
to determine the applicability of an "incendiary bomb" shipping rate.
The Court declared that considerations of uniformity and expert
administration of the pervasive regulatory scheme compelled
deference to the ICC, since the issue required a working knowledge of
the transportation policies underlying the rate in question. 38 Relying
on the language in Great Northern, the Court believed that the
determination of the meaning of "incendiary bomb" involved factors
which presupposed an "acquaintance with many intricate facts of
transportation. 3 9
The initial issue in Rosado v. Wyman involved the interpretation
of section 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, which required a
critical examination of the statute and its legislative history. After
determining that section 402(a)(23) required New York to adjust
upward its "standard of need" as computed for AFDC purposes, the
Court was then confronted with the question of whether the New
York statute had, in fact, lowered the "standard of need" by
adopting a new system of computation. The Court resolved this
problem by accepting the findings of the district court that significant
34. Id. at 291.
35. See, id. at291 n.1.
36. The.Court pointed out that the uniformity necessary to implement the Commerce Act
would not be sacrificed by allowing a court to make the initial decision since the construction of
interstate tariffs is a question of federal law which could ultimately be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 291-92.
37. 352 U.S. 59 (1956). See 55 MICH. L. REv. 864 (1957).
38. 352 U.S. at 65-66.
39. Id. See also United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 352 U.S. 77 (1956). The 1970
decisions indicate that courts continue to defer to the proper agency where special expertise is
required to resolve an issue. See Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Furniture Forwarders, Inc., 420 F.2d
385, 388 (8th Cir. 1970); cf. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 309 F. Supp. 983, 986
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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reductions in both benefits and standards of need had been effected by
New York.40 Conceding great flexibility in the states to construct
"standard of need" schedules which consolidated or averaged various
items, the Court focused on a fact not disputed by New York:
"special" grants had been eliminated from that state's AFDC
program, and those grants had provided for recurring expenses
formerly considered essential by New York.4" Clearly, the majority of
the Court felt themselves adequate to the task of analyzing the New
York welfare amendment for its compliance with federal
requirements. Justice Black, however, argued that the sensitive issues
raised in Rosado were "exceedingly complex" and should have been
considered first by HEW. 2 The dissent also concentrated on two
other points: that the itatutory scheme embodied by the Social
Security Act contemplated HEW determination of a state's
conformity with the federal AFDC statute prior to any judicial
involvement, and that precipitous court action would not only
increase already overloaded court dockets but would provide an
incentive for HEW to evade its responsibilities by diverting sensitive
questions to the judiciary.4 The majority, however, was unwilling to
find that Congress intended to preclude federal court jurisdiction
where welfare recipients challenged the validity of a state statute. 44
In finding this judicial power to make the initial factual
determinations where federal welfare payments are involved, the
Court relied, in part, on Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,45 a drug-
labeling case which had rejected the proposition that explicit statutory
provisions for judicial review of certain administrative regulations
impliedly precluded judicial review of the agency's other regulatory
activities. 41 While Abbott Laboratories actually concerned the review
of agency decision-making and did not involve a primary jurisdiction
40. 304 F. Supp. at 1369, 1381. See 118 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 6, at 1162.
41. 397 U.S. at 417-18.
42. Id. at 433 (Black, J., dissenting), quoting 414 F.2d 170, 181 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
Such issues might include problems of efficiency within a state program, as well as a
determination of what constitutes items necessary for subsistence.
43. 397 U.S. at 434-35 (Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the importance of a
"statutory scheme" in dictating the kind of judicial review available, see 67 COLUM. L. REV.,
supra note 14, at 121-23.
44. 397 U.S. at 422.
45. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See generally Comment, Pre-Enforcement Review of
Administrative Regulations, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 505, 515 (1969).
46. 387 U.S. at 141, 144. See National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 735
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
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question, its import has been expanded to posit a basic presumption,
absent express congressional provision to the contrary, that the
federal courts are available to protect the interests of persons affected
by federal legislative programs, despite concurrent administrative
agency authority. 7 The statute involved in Rosado delegated state
conformity issues to HEW but did not mention claims by aggrieved
individuals; therefore, the Court declared: "[W]e find not the slightest
indication that Congress meant to deprive federal courts of their
traditional jurisdiction to hear and decide federal questions in the
field." 4 Furthermore, the Court cited a number of cases in which
welfare recipients had successfully invoked a judicial forum for the
initial determination of nonconformity issues." King v. Smith " is
representative of the welfare cases adverted to and embraced the same
statutory scheme as Rosado. The AFDC claimants in King were
permitted to attack a state's so-called "substitute father" regulation,
whereby payments were denied to the children of a mother who
cohabited with an able-bodied man, without prior recourse to H EW.
Plaintiffs in King and Rosado had no administrative procedures
directly available to them, and even though a nonconformity hearing
may be had by the state, the inability of welfare recipients to initiate
or participate in such a hearing was a principal reason that the
Rosado Court refused to invoke either the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or exhaustion of remedies. 51
While it is difficult to draw any general conclusions from Rosado
v. Wyman concerning primary jurisdiction, it does seem that the
Court was influenced by the many facts unique to the particular
case, 52 including H EW's decision to remain "aloof" from the early
47. 397 U.S. at 420. See National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 735-36 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 & n.19-20
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742, 746
(N.D. I11. 1970); Leyden v.' FAA, 315 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Triangle
Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20, 26-27 (S.D.W.Va. 1969), affd per curiam,
429 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970).
48. 397 U.S. at 422.
49. Id. The Court noted, however, the "escalating involvement" by federal courts in welfare
litigation and suggested that the area of welfare benefits should initially be "formally placed"
under HEW supervision. Id. See generally Barrett, The New Role of the Courts in Developing
Public Welfare Law. 1970 DuiKE L.J. 1.
50. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
51. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
52. The importance of a case's peculiar factual background in influencing the court's
application of the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" is illustrated by Catholic Medical Center,
Inc. v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), where plaintiff-hospitals sought to
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judicial proceedings despite the district court's efforts to obtain the
agency's opinions.s' Much hinged upon the intangible issue of whether
the New York amendment clearly contravened federal law or whether
it would require HEW expertise to resolve the question. In light of
Justice Harlan's feeling that HEW would probably serve as a better
forum for welfare claimants," National Welfare Rights Organization
v. Finch's represents the natural extension of the Rosado decision. In
National Welfare Rights Organization the District of Columbia
Circuit required HEW to permit welfare claimants to intervene in
agency proceedings where a hearing on the conformity of Nevada and
Connecticut statutes with federal AFDC requirements had already
been scheduled. The court distinguished Rosado as an instance where
hearings had not been announced and declared its decision the first
step in a solution to the problem of increasing welfare litigation in the
federal courts." Presumably, however, had HEW hearings not been
imminent, the court of appeals in National Welfare Rights Organi-
zation would have allowed the AFDC recipients to seek a judicial
remedy without having to await them, since the welfare recipients
could not have initiated such HEW action. 57
While Rosado v. Wyman was concerned with the question of
whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was applicable at all, two
other 1970 decisions considered the further question of the effect an
agency ruling would have upon a court which had referred for
administrative action an issue which clearly fell within an agency's
"primary jurisdiction." In Locust Cartage Co., Inc. v.
Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc.,58 a carrier brought suit in a
invalidate a 1969 amendment to New York's Public Health Law which purported to "freeze"
rates of payment to hospitals participating in the federal-state Medicaid program, allegedly in
violation of federal law. The following factors contributed to the court's proceeding directly to
adjudicate the controversy prior to an HEW determination on the conformity issue: limitations
on HEW's power to protect the hospitals, since, by agency admission, HEW could not order
retroactive Medicaid payments; the relative simplicity of the facts presented, obviating any need
for agency expertise; the lack of available procedure for the hospitals to obtain an administrative
determination; the declaration by HEW in its amicus curiae brief that the New York statute
violated federal laws; and an express intent by New York to conform to the federal require-
ments. See also id. at 1266.
53. 397 U.S. at 407. Yet, this does seem consistent with HEW's claim of primary
jurisdiction, which would have given the agency priority in rendering a decision and would have
required that the district court hold the action in abeyance pending HEW determination.
54. Id. at 422.
55. 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
56. Id. at 738.
57. Id.
58. 430 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 964 (1970).
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district court to recover the difference between its published tariffs
and the lower rates it had charged as a result of a complex contractual
relationship with a larger shipping company. The district court
initially directed the parties to seek an advisory opinion from the ICC
and later ordered that proceedings be initiated for a formal
declaratory order by the Commission. 9 Retaining jurisdiction
pending agency action, the district court included in its order of
referral certain "assumptions" upon which the ICC determination
should be based:W The ICC trial examiner ruled that the carrier was
required to charge its published rates. Yet, even after Commission
adoption of this decision, the district court, substituting its own
findings of fact and conclusions of law, held against the carrier,
contrary to the ICC ruling." On appeal, the First Circuit considered
two principal issues: whether the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction"
required that the ICC initially determine whether the carrier's
published rates had to be levied and whether the ICC had rendered a
formal judgment which was binding upon the district court. In
answering the first question in the affirmative, the court of appeals
properly considered the complexity of the factual situation involved
and the lack of experience of courts in resolving intricate
transportation issues . 2 The First Circuit found the second issue-the
effect of the ICC order on the district court-more difficult. While the
district court had failed to rule explicitly that the doctrine of primary
jusisdiction applied, the court of appeals considered this implicit in
the lower court's referral to the agency while retaining jurisdiction.
Moreover, despite the district court's inclusion of "assumptions" in
its order of referral, the ICC trial examiner had apparently made.his
own findings of fact, based partially upon extensive affidavits filed by
the parties." Therefore, the Commission's order had th8 character of
a formal ruling rather than an advisory opinion, and it thus fulfilled
the requisites of agency action which is conclusive under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine.Y
59. This action is consistent with a referral to the ICC under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. See note 24 supra and note 81 infra.
60. 430 F.2d at 338 n.3.
61. Id. at 339.
62. Because of the broader issues of transportation policy raised and the need for
uniformity, the court held the matter within the ICC's primary jurisdiction. Id. at 340; cf id. at
340 n.5; Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Furniture Forwarders, Inc., 420 F.2d 385, 389 (8th Cir.
1970). See text accompanying note 39 supra.
63. 430 F.2d at 340-41.
64. Apparently the shipper, against whom the ICC order had gone, argued that the
Commission's opinion was merely advisory in nature and not binding upon the district court.
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Regretfully, by inartful language, the Locust Cartage court left
unclear the proper method by which review of the ICC ruling could
have been accomplished. Generally, where an agency has, primary
jurisdiction of an issue and a court suspends its determination pending
agency action, the subsequent administrative order, if supported by
substantial evidence, becomes conclusive on that issue.6" However, a
1964 amendment to the Federal Judicial Code provided that when a
district court refers a question for ICC determination, it shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to review the Commission's order.6" In Locust
Cartage the First Circuit held that the ICC ruling in that case was
binding upon-the district court because no application for review had
been filed within the required 90-day period, 67 perhaps suggesting that
a separate court action would have been necessary to challenge the
Commission order. This would be plainly contrary to the decision in
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,"' where the Court of Claims
interpreted the 1964 amendment to the Judicial Code as not requiring
the "pointless duplication and needless expense" of a separate
action. 9 Consequently, all that was required by the statute was the
filing of an additional pleading before the same court which had
originally referred the issue to the ICC.70 Presumably, such additional
pleading must be presented within the 90-day period.7'
Even if the court of appeals had accepted this interpretation of the nature of the ICC opinion,
precedent exists for not rejecting the determination of an administrative agency even under such
circumstances unless it is arbitrary or unsupported by substantial evidence. Seaboard Airline
R.R. Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 651, 656 (Ct. CI. 1967). But see Catholic Medical Center,
Inc. v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (where the views of HEW were
presented via amicus curiae brief and were deemed not conclusive by the court).
65. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Benjamin Harris & Co., 245 F. Supp. 467,471 (N.D. Ill. 1965);
Fremlin, Primary Jurisdiction and the Federal Maritime Commission, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 733
(1967); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1055 & n.57 (1964); Kestenbaum,
Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the Allocation
of Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812, 813-14 & n.8 (1967).
66. 28 US.C. § 1336(b) (1964).
67. 430 F.2d at 341. See Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 575, 582 n.5 (N.D. Ohio
1969); 28 U.S.C. § 1336(c) (1964).
68. 387 F.2d 657 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
69. Id. at 660.
70. Id.; see Seaboard Airline R.R. v. United States, 387 F.2d 651, 655 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
71. This statutory requirement seems redundant, for it might be presumed that a party to a
postponed judicial proceeding would naturally desire a court to review an adverse agency
determination. And the failure to file the supplemental pleading may present a pitfall for the
unwary, who understandably might assume that a court referring an issue would be inherently
competent to review any agency action stemming from such referral. The court in Locust
Cartage recognized the potential harshness of its decision. 430 F.2d at 341. Nevertheless, as the
court further noted, had it felt that the ICC order was not based upon sufficient facts, it still
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The Supreme Court in Port of Boston Marine Terminal
Association v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic72 seems by
implication to have accepted the McLean Trucking Co. interpretation
but only where an ICC ruling is involved. Port of Boston concerned a
dispute between ship owners and wharf operators over charges
accruing from cargo stranded on the docks during a 1965
longshoremen's strike. Prior to 1964 the wharf owners had charged
the cargo consignees a daily fee for cargo left unmoved after 5 days
pursuant to a tariff approved by the Federal Maritime Commission.
In 1964, without prior FMC approval, the Terminal Association
revised its fees to assess part of the daily charge against the ship
owners, certain of whom refused to pay. The state action filed by the
Terminal Association to recover the fees was removed to a federal
district court, which postponed the litigation while retaining
jurisdiction, pending a FMC ruling on the legality of the new fee
assessment plan. After the FMC upheld the revised fee structure, the
association of ship owners sought review in the court of appeals, but
its late petition was dismissed as untimely. Subsequently, an
individual ship owner filed with the FMC for reconsideration of its
order, but this petition also was dismissed as untimely. Choosing not
to seek direct judicial review of the Commission's denial of a
rehearing, the individual ship owner petitioned to intervene in the
postponed district court litigation. Although this request was granted,
the, court refused to collaterally review the FMC order on the merits
and, following the agency's decision, rendered judgment in favor of
the wharf owners. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the
grounds that the FMC decision contravened a prior Supreme Court
decision and was reviewable collaterally on the merits in the district
court.1 In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court rejected
the power of the district court to review the Commission's order since,
by statute, the courts of appeal have exclusive jurisdiction to review
final orders of the FMC.71 Distinguishing the review of ICC orders,
whereby referring courts retain jurisdiction over appeals from
subsequent Commission decisions,75 the Court asserted that the
might have refused to abide by such order and could have remanded for further Commission
proceedings. Id.; see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Benjamin.Harris & Co., 245 F. Supp. 467,474 (N.D.
111. 1965).
72. 400 U.S. 62, rev'g sub nom. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Boston Shipping
Ass'n, Inc., 420 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1970).
73. 420 F.2d at 422-23.
74. 400 U.S. at 69.
75. Id. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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statutory purpose of ensuring that the Attorney General would be
able to participate precluded any review of FMC orders other than in
the courts of appeal .7
Port of Boston suggests that where a district Court retains
jurisdiction and refers to the ICC an issue within the agency's primary
jurisdiction, the subsequent agency order may be reviewed by the
referring court in the same action; but, where a district court refers an
issue to the FMC 77 and retains jurisdiction, review of the-agency
decision must be had in a separate dction in the courts of appeal,
before the postponed district court action may proceed. Failure to
seek such direct review would mean the FMC's order would become
binding upon the district court which had referred the issue to the
Commission.7
There is still the unresolved question of where judicial review of
issues referred under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to other
federal agencies, such as HEW, must be sought, when no clear
statutory guidance is available. While the district court in Rosado
should properly have dismissed the suit had it decided to defer to
HEW primary jurisdiction, 7 in Catholic Medical Center, Inc. v.
Rockefellerse the district court conceivably could have postponed the
litigation while retaining its own jurisdiction and submitted the
question of the New York statute's conformity with the federal
Medicaid requirements to HEW.8' Had it done this and the agency's
conformity ruling been rendered adverse to the plaintiff-hospitals,
76. 400 U.S. at 70. No indication was given by the Court why the Attorney General could
not also participate in federal district court proceedings.
77. The statutory scheme for judicial review involved in Port of Boston, 28 U.S.C. § 2342
(Supp. V, 1970), applies to final orders of the FCC, Dept. of Agriculture, and AEC as well.
78. 400 U.S. at 72. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
79. Since the welfare recipients were essentially seeking a determination of the New York
statute's conformity with federal AFDC requirements, HEW could be able to provide all of the
relief requested-in the form of a finding of conformity or nonconformity-and nothing would
be gained by retaining court jurisdiction nor lost if a dismissal were granted. See JAFFE 137-41.
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
80. 305 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). See note 52 supra for a discussion of this case.
81. Catholic Medical Center differs from Rosado in that the former litigation involved a
remedy which HEW alleged it was without authority to grant: requiring payment of the
difference between what the plaintiff-hospitals had actually received and what they should have
been paid. 305 F. Supp. at 1270. Since only the court could provide this remedy, it could
properly postpone the litigation pending HEW determination of the conformity issue, yet retain
jurisdiction over the action. See notes 24 & 79 supra. See General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El
Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 428 (1940); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Furniture
Forwarders, Inc., 420 F.2d 385, 390 (8th Cir. 1970).
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how would they have been required to seek judicial review of the H EW
order: in a subsequently-filed pleading in the district court where the
action had originally been brought and was postponed, or in a
separate suit filed under the review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act? 2 Logic and considerations of judicial economy
suggest that additional pleadings in the original court would be the
more practical solution. But the statutory provision requiring state
appeals from HEW conformity decisions to be taken to the courts of
appeal8 3 might lead the Supreme Court to require that a separate
action be filed even by non-state litigants."
II: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) remained controversial
during 1970; it was followed with hesitancy by administrators and
interpreted with difficulty by the courts. The Act was adopted to
facilitate public awareness of the activities of the federal government,
and it requires that certain materials, such as an agency's procedural
regulations and general policy statements, be published in the Federal
Register2 and that other materials, including final agency rulings, be
made available for public inspection and copying.3 More importantly,
however, the Act compels the release of existing agency records which
have been sufficiently identified by the requester4 and which are not
within any of the FOIA's nine specific exemptions.5 While some
litigation has arisen over the sufficiency of agency publication of
82. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970); see 305 F. Supp. at 1264 (suggesting the applicability
of the APA to the plaintiff-hospitals as aggrieved parties).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 316 (Supp. V, 1970).
84. The Supreme Court has recognized the potential problems in the primary jurisdiction
field caused by separate suits to review the subsequent agency action. Yet the Court neither
prohibited such bifurcation of litigation nor offered clear guidance for preventing such
duplication. See Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 85 (1962)
(footnote marked with an asterisk).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1970).
2. Id. § 552(a)(1).
3. Id. § 552(a)(2).
4. Id. § 552(a)(3).
5. Id. § 552(b)(l)-(9).
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